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The first year of the second administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has not just tested virtually all 14 Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member states’ respective relations with the United States. It has precipitated a fault line in the regional grouping, too, much as during Trump’s first-term, when CARICOM was divided on U.S. foreign policy direction relating to Venezuela.
These developments provide the backdrop to a tumultuous year for these small states as regards Washington-facing foreign policy.
In 2026, these countries will likely face the stark reality of even more haphazard foreign policy dealings with the U.S. and further blows to regional cohesion from within their own ranks.
The Trump administration’s recently issued proclamation imposing partial entry restrictions on nationals of Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica offers a timely picture of the reality of Washington’s scattershot approach to relations with CARICOM member states. Blindsided by this proclamation, these Caribbean countries wasted little time in marshalling political and diplomatic resources to engage with Washington on the matter.
Washington suspended this proclamation regarding both countries, which took on board a new dispensation going forward concerning their nationals’ entry in to America.
This is the latest, high-profile episode in bilateral relations between respective CARICOM member states and the United States that, on one level, have been cordial and, on another level, have been difficult in light of different visions of the conduct of international relations.
Some three months into the Trump administration, it became apparent that U.S.-CARICOM relations faced an uncertain moment.
At the time, I assessed: “Growing policy differences between the two sides were testing the limits of these relations, with Washington wagering it can strong-arm America’s so-called ‘third border’ — the Caribbean — to meet the various demands of the Trump 2.0 era.”
This assessment did not anticipate the extent of the complexity that would later undergird those relations, stemming from two key variables: (i) the change over from the People’s National Movement-led government to the United National Congress-led government in Trinidad and Tobago at the outset of the second quarter of 2025; and (ii) the now months-long surge in U.S. military power in the Caribbean.
Kamla Persad-Bissessar, who was first prime minister from 2010 to 2015, won Trinidad and Tobago’s general elections that were held this past April. Seemingly risking the cohesion of CARICOM, shortly following the start of her second term as prime minister, her government backed the aforesaid surge.
That foreign policy-related calculation marked the beginning of a new phase of relations between Port of Spain and Washington, whose pressure campaign against Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro’s regime has had a knock-on effect on the bloc’s politics. Note well: Port of Spain recently signalled that it is keen to re-evaluate its relationship with the bloc, which CARICOM insiders opine has seemingly become an afterthought in Trinidad and Tobago foreign policy.
Persad-Bissessar also reportedly distanced her government from a statement by the Bureau of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM that expressed “concern” over the proclamation issued by Washington on December 16 imposing partial entry restrictions on nationals of Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica. (That said, at least one other regional leader has done the same.)
It appears that for Port of Spain, the road to foreign policy success leads through Washington. Even as some national-level decision-makers have determined it has already panned out, Trinidad and Tobago’s own theory of foreign policy success in Trump 2.0 has come up for scrutiny.
This is in a context where the U.S. military’s “Operation Southern Spear” personifies the current U.S. administration’s hard power, foreign policy-related ethos.
Moreover, most of the other CARICOM member states’ leaders have spoken out against this new normal.
Trinidad and Tobago is prepared to go it alone on support for “Operation Southern Spear,” facing backlash from a cross-section of stakeholders. (Guyana is also supportive of this operation, albeit less vocally.)
Persad-Bissessar’s government has been put on the foreign policy defensive, yet again, coming under the spotlight in relation to the recently-orchestrated United States’ blockade of sanctioned oil tankers entering and leaving Venezuelan shores.
According to some claims, which contend it is playing for even higher stakes, Persad-Bissessar’s government has its hand in this latest American foreign policy-related gambit.
Just days earlier, Caracas accused Port of Spain of involvement in U.S. forces’ (now first such) seizure of a sanctioned oil tanker off Venezuela’s coast. This statement prompted immediate pushback from Port of Spain, which is also unfazed by other threats of a commercial nature that are coming from Caracas.
This particular escalation of U.S. military operations in the Caribbean ushers in a new front in the United States’ pressure campaign against the Maduro regime, insofar as Venezuelan crude oil exports — a key revenue stream for this country — are now apparently fair game.
Simultaneously, Washington has been hardening its rhetoric directed at the Maduro regime.
Cuba, perhaps more than any other country in the wider Latin American and Caribbean region, has come to rely on such shipments. Thus, along with others like it, this development is deeply disconcerting for Havana.
Now, Washington is betting that this strategy of going after oil tankers will likely also redound to its benefit elsewhere. For Trump administration Cuba hawks, as analysts assess, the road to Havana runs through Venezuela.
It is also notable that the Maduro regime seems intent on promulgating the view that Port of Spain has a shared stake in an ever-expanding American pressure campaign against it, under the aegis of the U.S. military’s “Operation Southern Spear.” Some analysts downplay this view, though. Were Washington and Caracas to engage in direct conflict with one another, they conclude, “Trinidad and Tobago has nothing to gain.”
What is fair to say is that Port of Spain has a particular take on this operation, such that Trinidad and Tobago is an outlier relative to most of its sister CARICOM member states.
According to the country’s Foreign Ministry, at this time, the government’s sustained cooperation with U.S. authorities has borne fruit. The Foreign Ministry underscores: “Trinidad and Tobago has benefited from joint military training exercises, enhanced surveillance capabilities, including the installation of an effective radar system, and
collaborative efforts that have contributed to the interdiction of millions of dollars’ worth of illegal narcotics.”
Reportedly, an American military radar was recently installed in-country. According to the government, that installation has already boosted national authorities’ drug interdiction efforts in-country.
Also in its statement, the Foreign Ministry indicated that “In keeping with established bilateral cooperation, the Ministry has granted approvals for United States military aircraft to transit Trinidad and Tobago’s airports in the coming weeks.” This statement goes on to add: “The United States has advised that these movements are logistical in nature, facilitating supply replenishment and routine personnel rotations.”
Still, among some quarters in Trinidad and Tobago’s society, significant questions remain about Port of Spain’s overarching approach to “Operation Southern Spear.” (Trinidad and Tobago is among a small handful of smaller nations in the wider Latin American and Caribbean region that have thrown their lot in with Washington’s scaled up military operations in the Caribbean.) The Trinidad and Tobago government has hit back at those who have criticized what it calls a ‘Trinidad and Tobago first’ position.
Trinidad and Tobago’s sister CARICOM member states have done their level best not to be drawn into the fray, in spite of their deep concern that Port of Spain’s deference to Washington runs the risk of undermining CARICOM unity.
Of late, there are signs that this quiet diplomacy may not last much longer. A case in point is the strongly worded statement issued by the Office of The Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda on December 21, responding to Persad-Bissessar’s government publicly chastising some sister CARICOM member states’ now days-old diplomatic actions vis-à-vis a sensitive foreign policy matter involving Washington. In posts to his social media, Antigua and Barbuda’s emissary to Washington reinforced this message.
That message quickly backfired, having not gone down well in Port of Spain. In remarks posted to X, formerly known as Twitter, also on December 21, Persad-Bissessar is said to have relayed (in part) the following: “CARICOM has aligned itself with the Maduro narco government headed by a dictator who has imprisoned or killed thousands of Venezuelans who oppose him.”
That post, which seemingly plays to an audience of one (i.e. Trump), goes on to read: “Trinidad and Tobago wants no part of that alignment, we don’t support dictatorship and drug trafficking and we don’t support CARICOM in their zone of peace fakery.” It also proffers advice to Antigua and Barbuda’s prime minister and that country’s emissary to Washington.
On the CARICOM side that has come out against “Operation Southern Spear,” all of the member states concerned have converged around such deeply held CARICOM foreign policy beliefs as peace over conflict and multilateralism over unilateralism, among other norms.
This military operation heralds an era in which, once again, the nexus between American primacy and geopolitical dominance is on full display in the Western Hemisphere.
Indeed, the latest U.S. National Security Strategy dubs this era the ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine. This so-called corollary’s key features are “Enlist and Expand” and, relatedly, the projection of U.S. hegemony across the Western Hemisphere.
Fears over any ‘might makes right’ doctrine becoming the modus vivendi of any state, not least the world’s preeminent superpower, are at the core of why most CARICOM member states have responded in the way that they have to “Operation Southern Spear.”
When CARICOM leaders met this past October they focused, inter alia, on “the increased security build up in the Caribbean and the potential impacts on Member States.” In outlining their commitment to the fight against narcotrafficking and some other illicit crimes, they underscored that this should be done “through ongoing international cooperation and within international law.” Of note, “[t]hey reaffirmed the principle of maintaining the Caribbean Region as a Zone of Peace and the importance of dialogue and engagement towards the peaceful resolution of disputes and conflict.”
Instructively, Trinidad and Tobago reserved its position.
In effect, at a time when most CARICOM member states are hedging against U.S. unilateralism qua interventionism by leaning into each other and their core foreign policy beliefs, Trinidad and Tobago is bucking the bloc’s long-standing foreign policy paradigm.
At every turn, in the months since the September 2025 advent of the U.S. military build-up in the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago has been out front as an American backstop.
These foreign policy-related dynamics provide little basis for optimism that, collectively, CARICOM member states can see eye to eye with each other on this thorny geopolitical moment.
Rising tensions are also making it hard for them to close ranks in this moment, placing CARICOM interests at risk.
That is particularly unfortunate, as unity has been at the heart of CARICOM strategy in respect of international engagement for decades. In the realm of the conduct of international relations, CARICOM member states have been like-minded nations, standing shoulder to shoulder with each other. In doing so, a common set of foreign policy beliefs has been their lodestar. Traditionally, this has also been the case for Trinidad and Tobago.
As such, this moment has opened a breach within CARICOM, which could suffer ill effects from such a rupture for years if the bloc’s leaders do not effectively grapple with it.
More broadly, insofar as 2025 was the year that the second Trump administration unveiled its ‘might makes right’-styled security doctrine, 2026 will be when Washington rolls out that stratagem in earnest. Its effects will be far-reaching in the Western Hemisphere—in particular.
There is a scenario in which this doctrine will likely undermine CARICOM member states’ ability to bring combined foreign policy-related strengths to bear in defence of their interests.
By the same token, as the foregoing analysis suggests, such interests may no longer be shared in the same way that they once were.
Nand C. Bardouille, Ph.D., is the manager of The Diplomatic Academy of the Caribbean in the Institute of International Relations at The University of the West Indies (The UWI) St. Augustine Campus, Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of The UWI.
This article was first published by The Nassau Guardian on December 23, 2025.
